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PHANTOM MENACE: WHAT JUNIOR GREEK ARMY OFFICERS  
HAVE TO SAY ABOUT TURKS AND TURKEY 
 
Elisabeth Kirtsoglou 
 
 
This chapter focuses on the discourse of low-rank Greek army officers about the Turks 
and the state of Turkey. This is a combination of the hegemonic narratives promoted by 
the Greek state and other forms of conventional, informal rhetoric. Concentrating on the 
Greek and Turkish States rather than on the respective populations the officers reveal a 
form of nationalism built on seemingly rational arguments as opposed to sentimental 
reactions. Their struggle to think globally however, does not necessarily allow them to 
disengage from a view of the world order that is very much based on local, culturally 
informed perceptions about micro-level social interaction. Despite their attempt to 
analyze the current situation in terms of international relations, the subjects of this study 
do not abstain from recycling hypothetical scenarios and conspiracy theories that 
ultimately present Greece and Turkey as predictably non-sovereign countries whose 
policies are dictated by larger and more powerful interests, states and coalitions. 
Key words: International politics (perceptions of), conspiracy theory, identity, 
Great Powers, Greece and Turkey. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1999, Greece and Turkey, two neighboring countries that have traditionally been 
regarded as potential adversaries, are engaged in a systematic effort to build mutual trust 
and to resolve their differences in an amiable manner. Besides its political dimension, 
the recent rapprochement is an intriguing academic subject in itself as it allows for the 
recognition of the differences within as well as the similarities between the respective 
cultures. During the last six years, various segments of the Greek population have 
expressed diverse opinions about the new friendly shift in Greek-Turkish relations, a 
phenomenon colloquially termed as ‘Greco-Turkish friendship’. This chapter focuses on 
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the discourses put forward by junior Greek army officers during different stages of this 
Greek-Turkish rapprochement – and in particular in the period between 2000 and 2003 –  
seeking to highlight that not only do different groups of individuals promote varying 
discourses about the neighboring Other but also, and perhaps more importantly, that the 
same individuals often foster seemingly contradictory elements in their rhetoric, which 
thus appears to be constantly shifting and filled with numerous inconsistencies (cf. 
Kirtsoglou and Sistani 2003).  
 The seemingly contradictory elements that appear on my informants’ agendas 
and perspectives strongly relate to where they perceive – not Turkey’s but – Greece’s 
position to be in the international political order. Turkey becomes, inveterately, a 
suitable mirror into which the Self can look and see itself: its assumed weaknesses and 
strengths, its own ambivalence, its own feelings of centrality and marginality (see also, 
Argyrou this volume). Turkey as a proximate nation has the unique ability to stand 
simultaneously for what is intimate, alien, admired, feared, respected or despised 
depending on the context and the circumstances. It is a symbol of proximity and 
distance, of what one admires and hates about the Self rather than the Other. In the 
discourses of my informants the image of the Turk is largely a projection of what is to be 
Greek, only at times a projection that is inverted and distorted to signify what the Greek 
should abjure, what the Greek was and is not, and simultaneously what Greeks as an 
imaginary, collective entity aspire and strive to be.  
All the different views that my informants express are permeated by a collective 
representation of the national Self and the national Other as essentially vulnerable 
entities directly dependent on ‘Powers’ much greater than themselves (cf. Sutton 2003). 
Concentrating on the Greek and Turkish nation-states, rather than on their respective 
populations, the army officers I studied struggle to think ‘globally’. Their struggle, 
however, does not necessarily allow them to disengage from a view of the world order 
that is very much based on local, culturally informed perceptions of the micro-level 
social interaction. Despite their attempts to analyze political circumstances in terms of 
international relations, the subjects of this study do not abstain from recycling 
hypothetical scenarios and conspiracy theories that ultimately present Greece and 
Turkey as predictably non-sovereign countries whose policies are dictated by larger and 
more powerful interests, states and coalitions (cf. Brown & Theodossopoulos 2000, 
2003). 
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Based on my own ethnographic material, the main argument of this paper 
unfolds in two parallel directions. First, in relation to national identity and employing 
Anderson’s notion of ‘imagined communities’ (1983: 15), I argue that citizens of nation 
states imagine the Other to be as much a member of a community as is the Self. In the 
minds of a nation’s inhabitants the image of communion with their fellow members is 
potent and alive despite the fact that they will never know the vast majority of them, 
while each citizen ‘has complete confidence in the steady anonymous, simultaneous 
activity’ of her fellow citizens (Anderson 1983: 31). It is because of the latter conviction, 
or ‘sense of simultaneity’ (Banks 1996: 127) of the national Self, that one perceives the 
national Other, not simply as an individual or a group of individuals, but as a member of 
an equally ‘synchronized’ and homogenous community with common perceptions, 
aspirations and desires for action (cf. Loizos 1988). 
Huges (1994) puts forward a similar argument concerning ethnic groups. He 
claims that: ‘[a]n ethnic group is not one because of the degree of measurable or 
observable difference from other groups; it is an ethnic group … because the people in it 
and the people out of it know that it is one; because both the ins and the outs feel and act 
as if it were a separate group’ (1994: 91 original emphasis). Likewise, it could be said 
that national identity is constructed around the imagined community of the Self as well 
as the imagined community of the Other, which is perceived and represented in the same 
essentialist and naturalized fashion as a stable, permanent and homogenous collectivity.  
Nevertheless, when subject to close examination, national identities are not as 
homogenous as they first appear to be (cf. Hirschon 2000; Brown and Hamilakis 2003). 
On the contrary, and this is the second part of my argument, national identity – like any 
other category of identity – consists of multiple and often contradictory elements, being 
the result of various and sometimes contrasting identifications. Its cultural contents, as 
Ardener has suggested, are ‘constantly shifting’ (1989: 69) constituting national identity 
as an unfinished entity, one that is always in the process of becoming.  
The incompleteness and permeability of national identity (see Theodossopoulos, 
this volume) is, I believe, closely associated with its relational and perfomative 
character. With reference to the former, a number of theorists have stressed the 
significance of relationships – either between groups or between groups and states – and 
the importance of interaction in the formation of national and ethnic identities (Barth 
1969; Bromley 1974; Cohen 1985, Williams 1989; Chapman 1992; Forsythe 1989; 
Eriksen 1993; Jenkins 2003).
1
 The claim that national identity ought to be viewed as 
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positional is also supported by anthropologists who specialize in the ethnographic region 
of Greece. Hirschon for instance calls for our ‘attention to specificity’ and argues that 
identity ‘needs to be interpreted in a particular socio-political context at a specific time’ 
(2000: 165). Similarly, Argyrou claims that identities are relational since they express 
‘the meaning and significance attached to oneself and others’ (this volume: 4). As it will 
be demonstrated in the ethnography that follows, the army officers I studied – in line 
with the majority of the subjects who identify themselves as Greek – always negotiate 
their sense of national Self vis-à-vis other imagined communities, constantly oscillating 
between their perception of the occident and the orient (cf. Herzfeld 1987). It is perhaps 
as a consequence of this that Turkey and her citizens are regarded by my informants as 
being – similarly to Greece – a collectivity in transition with the same aspirations of 
‘becoming’ a European state, a nation subject to the same predicament of being 
peripheral and dependent upon the ‘Great Powers’.  
Having stressed its relational character, I am inclined to think that national 
identity is not only constituted in actual or imagined relations with other nations and 
coalitions, but also that these relations and the collective representations of them are 
partly responsible for the fluid and dynamic nature of identities. Because the national 
Self is always in the process of becoming, the apparent instability of rhetorical narrative 
views and beliefs about the imagined communities of the Self and the Other is probably 
also partly founded on the performative quality of national identity. Again, a number or 
theorists discuss practice
2
 either in the form of daily performances (Linde-Laursen 1993; 
Billig 1995; Wilk 1993), the manipulation of symbols (Cohen 1994), or political action 
(Weber 1978). With special reference to Greece, Hamilakis draws attention to ‘national 
pedagogical procedures’ that involve bodily experiences and performances ‘which are 
instrumental in constructing a bodily mnemonic habitus, a sensuous reception of 
national truths’ (2003: 60-61).3 Learning through performance the officially condoned 
‘virtues’ of Greekness notwithstanding, Herzfeld has argued that ‘Greekness’ – and most 
importantly all its ‘unofficial’ features – is ‘embodied in social attitudes and physical 
movement’ (1995: 126). Factionalism, localism, disorganization, unruly individualism 
and bravado compose ‘a great deal of Greekness that the official ideology would rather 
not know about’ (ibid) and constitute the ‘experiential and practical dimensions of 
cultural intimacy’ (Herzfeld 1995: 140). 
 The way ‘we’ perform nationality and the manner in which we know or imagine 
the Other(s) perform their nationality is, I claim, often responsible for our changing 
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perceptions of both the Self and the Other, as well as for the various inconsistencies and 
contradictory elements inherent in our discourses. Much of the challenge, as well as the 
perpetuation of identity norms is perhaps to be found in this asymmetry between the 
instability of the performance of nationality and its actual stabilizing effects. Seen in this 
light, performance operates both as a reason and a reasoning tool. In other words, there 
are a number or actions, private, local, political and international which are supposedly 
‘explained by’ and, at the same time, seemingly explain one’s ‘belonging’ to a certain 
imagined community, the latter applying equally to the Self and the Other(s).   
 The following sections intend to ethnographically explicate all the 
aforementioned themes through the changing discourses of a loosely interconnected 
group of junior Greek army officers on Turks and Turkey. Although their rhetoric is to 
an extent particular to their status and occupation, much of what is being said also 
revolves around themes commonly explored by ordinary Greek commentators beyond 
the confines of this particular group. The discursive commonalities, however, of a 
number of subjects who identify themselves as Greek need not divert our attention from 
the fact that within the ethnographic context of Greece diversity is to be found as much 
as outside it.    
 
CONTENT AND PROTAGONISTS 
The ethnography presented in this chapter is based upon fieldwork carried out from the 
summer of 2000 until early 2003 among junior army officers serving in the area of 
Thessaly, in central Greece. The reason I have chosen to focus on this particular group is 
that although its members do not enjoy a high status within Greek society, when it 
comes to anthropological investigation they easily assume the standpoint of the 
connoisseur and try – almost consciously – to offer what they consider to be a learned 
exegesis of Greco-Turkish relations. Being so exposed to the official and hegemonic 
discourses of the state my informants’ rhetoric is perhaps an excellent example of the 
‘dialectical process’ between grand narratives and personal stories, ‘abstract 
formulations proposed by political parties’ and the ‘local and personal history’ of the 
everyday agent (Papadakis 1998: 150, 151, 161; cf. Hirschon 2000: 166).  
My informants belong to the generalized category of what is called in Greece 
karavanadhes, ‘the dixies’ or ‘the mess tins’ after the metal pot where food is supposed 
to be cooked in military camps. The meaning of the term is complex suggesting on the 
one hand that they chose their job because of the security it offers – steady salary and 
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not too many or too onerous responsibilities – and on the other that they are seen as not 
the cleverest or the most refined individuals one could fraternize with. The officers 
themselves do not necessarily enjoy talking about their job, which they do not perceive 
as being a glamorous one, and they don’t feel they are paid enough either. The majority 
of them admit pursuing a career in the army because of the employment security it 
entails, but they would have preferred to be civil servants of some other kind. They 
complain about the transfers, the nights they have to spend on standby in the camps and 
‘on watch’, the discipline and the uniform. They feel useful when they are summoned in 
extreme conditions such as forest fires – which are frequent in Greece – floods and 
earthquakes, but they also resent the perceptions of some fellow Greeks who feel that 
they are ‘paid out of taxes to sit and do nothing’.  
It is perhaps because the army is seen as an institution somehow related to 
Aegean and Balkan politics that the officers, when talking about Turkey and the Turks, 
try to distinguish themselves from what they regard to be ‘the views of the lay public’. 
Although their discourse is constituted of culturally recognizable patterns and themes, it 
is also unique in some respects in that it contains conscious claims to knowledge of 
political and diplomatic ‘truths’ that supposedly escape the attention of the daily 
interlocutor. Against different political circumstances, the officers express their views 
about Turkey engaging in distinct, complex and often contradictory forms of political 
aetiology, only to attest Theodossopoulos’ claim that political cosmologies are ‘systems 
of cultural justification and accountability’, symbolic of the actor’s attempt to partake in 
the creation of history and to ‘legitimize’ and explicate political and historical causality 
(Theodossopoulos, this volume).  
Greek-Turkish friendship, September 11
th
, decisions about the European army, 
the discussions in Copenhagen about Turkey’s incorporation into the EU, and finally the 
war against Iraq, are different occasions that trigger the production of different 
discourses about the Self and the Other, and different perceptions of ‘Our’ imagined 
community and ‘Our’ identity in relation to that community ‘We’ imagine ‘Them’ to be, 
the identity ‘We’ envisage ‘Them’ to have. For ultimately, although the officers discuss 
Turkey, it always seems that what is uppermost in their minds is Greece’s position in 
relation to the East, the West, the Europeans, the Americans and generally powers 
assumed and regarded as greater than the two countries. It is with reference to these 
powers that my informants, who identify themselves as Greek, articulate their national 
identity, employing Turkey – a prominent hero and a feared villain – as a yardstick, an 
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evaluative criterion through which they understand their own relationship with the 
‘Great Powers’. 
 
THE FIRST TIME 
Since the devastating earthquakes that happened at almost the same time – August and 
September 1999 – in Greece and Turkey, the two countries initiated a policy of mutual 
trust, co-operation and friendship. Istanbul or Constantinople (depending on which side 
of the Aegean one finds oneself)
4
 was the first to suffer from the devastating earthquake. 
The Greek state offered to Turkey humanitarian aid which was readily reciprocated in 
less than a month when large areas of Athens suffered a similar disaster. The autumn of 
1999 was an instance of de-collectivisation and re-humanisation of the Other, and 
despite its tragic character served as an excellent context for the commencement of a 
new era in relations between the two countries led by the then Turkish and Greek 
ministers of external affairs, Jem and Papandreou respectively.  
 Almost a year later, and while the developments of ‘Greco-Turkish friendship 
were a popular subject of discussion in Greece, my informants offered me their 
perspectives on this. Assuming the position of the ‘insider’ and the ‘politically aware’, 
the officers sought to promote the discourse of the ‘rational-professional-male’ who 
avoids sentimental reaction and is at any time able to engage in real politik coldly, 
calmly and above all ‘reasonably’. This is what Dimitris, a thirty-year old officer told 
me: 
Listen, people talk about friendship. My mum for instance uses the term friendship 
and she asks can you trust the Turks to be your friends? And she is being hopeful 
but slightly suspicious. What I have to say about this is ‘let’s be reasonable’. We 
are not talking about friendship between people here. Two countries are enemies or 
not enemies. To put it simply, they either have mutual claims or not. What you call 
friendship I call a peace policy and perhaps economic co-operation. What 
Papandreou and Jem try is to reach an agreement that Greece and Turkey can co-
exist without one being a threat to the other. The same way Greece is with Italy for 
instance.  
The commentary of the army officers at the time was revolving consistently around 
the concept of Turkey as a state. It was inspired by official discourses and replete with 
personal views about what ‘peaceful coexistence’ is and how it can be achieved at 
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diplomatic forums. My informants made constant attempts to reassess the position of 
Greece and its tactics as a state only to find them too ‘illogical’, ‘too spontaneous’ and 
mostly ineffective. As Thanasis, another junior officer added: 
States are not like people. States do not become friends. They become 
allies at best, and even alliance cannot be taken for granted. In a situation 
where it’s not in a state’s best interest to stand by another state, it doesn’t 
or at least it shouldn’t. To call it ‘friendship’ has a very Greek logic 
because Greece does not have a serious foreign policy. Look at the 
Europeans. Are they ever carried away by emotions? Look at us! Take 
Ocalan
5
 for example… a sentimental reaction. We thought that we can 
appear big and brave if we offer Ocalan asylum. We became friends with 
the Kurds all of a sudden without sitting down and examining: Is this in 
our best interest? What does Greece have to gain from it, if anything? 
Greco-Turkish friendship confronted Greek subjects with – to say the least – 
problematic inconsistencies in the collective biography of their imagined community. 
Looking back at just five years or so before the 1999 rapprochement the Greeks had to 
deal daily with numerous violations of the Greek FIR
6
 and mock aerial combats
7
, which 
were shown on the evening news. Such confrontations escalated in January 1996 in an 
incident relating to an islet in the Aegean sea (Imia in Greek, Kardak in Turkish) that 
almost embroiled the two countries in military engagement. Months before the 
earthquakes that brought the two countries together, most Greek citizens felt sympathy 
for the leader of the Kurdish movement and participated in heated demonstrations in the 
centre of Athens upon his arrest in February 1999. In this particular and immediate 
historical context, presented with the prospect of friendship with Turkey, the army 
officers ‘arrive at convenient explanations of the failures and disappointments of world 
politics’ (Theodossopoulos, this volume), in order to reconcile disparate events and thus 
offer a reasonable narrative of political causality.  
 Their confusion notwithstanding, my informants take a reflexive stance towards 
the Self in relation to the West and Europe where Greece aspires to belong, only to 
discover yet again and to their disappointment that what is so suggestively ‘Greek’ is not 
at the same time ‘European’. Sentimentality, disorganization and political bravado are in 
this case perhaps the very ‘backward’, the very ‘oriental’ features that connect Greece 
with Turkey, proving that the two countries can be seen as ‘culturally intimate’ (cf. 
Herzfeld 1995, 1997).   
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THE EUROARMY 
In late September 2000 the officers were adamant that ‘Greece will never go to war with 
Turkey. It is in nobody’s interest, unless of course the Americans wish it so, for reasons 
that we cannot currently foresee’. Their conviction was based on a perception of Turkey 
as – similarly to Greece – an organized, secular state with a ‘European orientation’ and 
which is in the process of modernization. Turkey and Greece share the parallel 
experience of a painstaking transformation from disorganization to organization, 
factionalism and corruption to modernization and political transparency, and ultimately 
from Orient to Occident (cf. Herzfeld 1995: 134).  What lies perhaps at the core of 
Greek perceptions of the imagined communities of the Self and the Other is the 
confidence that neither Greece nor Turkey are sovereign states. ‘[T]he logic of a society 
that collectively sees itself as oppressed by the outside world’ is projected onto the 
Other, who is subsequently perceived as having to equally ‘learn to be good European’ if 
the hope in ‘progress’ is to materialize (Herzfeld 1995: 134). Political and cultural 
incorporation into the West seems for both Greeks and Turks (always according to my 
informants and I believe other Greeks too) the only way towards gaining some 
sovereignty and some control over their respective fates. So long as Greece and Turkey 
are still ‘in transition’ they are seen as remaining nothing more than puppets in the hands 
of the ‘Great Powers’, the milieu which the two countries are deemed as not yet fully 
belonging to.
8
  
 The aforementioned belief became evident when the same officers who 
proclaimed that ‘Greece will never go to war with Turkey’, were extremely concerned 
over the matter of the Euroarmy. At the conferences in Nice (December 2000) and later 
in Laaken (December 2001) it was agreed that European defense will remain under 
NATO’s jurisdiction and that the 120.000 men of the EU’s RRF (Rapid Reaction Force) 
would be deployed only in cases of peripheral crises in countries outside the EU. Most 
Greeks –including my informants – had placed their hopes on the existence of the 
Euroarmy as a force designed to protect European borders and consequently Greece and 
Cyprus from the ‘Turkish menace’.9 When it was finally agreed that this would not be 
the case, feelings of insecurity and marginalisation overcame many Greeks who saw 
their role as the ‘peripheral entities of Europe’ being affirmed yet again (cf. Herzfeld 
1992). Typical is the comment of Yannis, a thirty-seven year old officer:  
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What would you expect? They [the Europeans] are using us. They play 
with us like puppets and when the time comes, when the Americans wish 
that war breaks out in the Balkans, they won’t be here to help us. They have 
no wish whatsoever to protect Greek interests against Turkey. Greece and 
its borders are not uncontested. Europeans or not, we’d better find a way to 
defend ourselves and not trust others to do so on our behalf. 
Turkey was seen at the time as having been able to manoeuvre Greece, but – and this is 
what I find particularly interesting – not on the basis of her own power. Although 
Turkey is indeed seen as the threat to Greece par excellence (cf. Loizos1988: 645), her 
powerful status is seen as always borrowed, the result of mortgaging her territory – so 
that US missiles could be fired from her military bases – or predictably supporting US 
policy in international affairs. The following statement of another officer is perhaps even 
more suggestive of the belief that Greece and Turkey probably share a common 
predicament: 
The Turks think they know how to play with European policy. They make 
sure certain things are settled before they finally join so that any future 
interests they might have, stay intact. But they are like us, naïve. They 
probably think they are smarter than the Europeans – as we do – but they 
are not. They exercised pressure – surely via the Americans – on the 
subject of the Euroarmy, and now they believe that should they join the EU 
they can still attack Greece since the Europeans intend to stay neutral. We 
Orientals (anatolites) naively believe that the Others (alloi, i.e., westerners) 
have bessa (honour) and that they keep their word, but they don’t. If and 
when Turkey joins the EU, the Turks will finally realise what kind of two-
faced bastards the Europeans are. The same way they play with us they will 
play with them. 
 
COPENHAGEN 
Early in 2002 the Greek military forces were confronted with a threatening prospect: it 
was proposed that a NATO strategic base in Larissa (Thessaly) should cease operating 
or its role should be downgraded for financial reasons. According to my informants, if 
that had happened several Greek islands may have found themselves under foreign 
operational control – even Turkish – since the area would fall under the jurisdiction of 
NATO’s Mediterranean HQs in Naples, Italy. It was perhaps a coincidence that 
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something similar was proposed for the Eski-Sehir base in Turkey and the two countries 
decided to cooperate in objecting to NATO’s decisions. Greece and Turkey finally 
succeeded, and Larissa as well as Eski-Sehir retained operational control of the Greek 
FIR and a large area of south-eastern Mediterranean respectively. Around the same time, 
the Greek military sent to the ministry of external affairs a number of propositions for 
the lessening of tension in the Aegean, but Turkey refused to discuss them and, as a 
result, although the Greek-Turkish collaboration was successful the military 
professionals said they were wary of the new developments in Greek-Turkish relations. I 
have asked some of the officers to comment upon these statements; they all seemed to 
agree with Kostas who readily complained: 
We thought that the Jem-Papandreou initiative would work. Greco-Turkish 
friendship! … what a good prospect indeed that would be! But can you 
trust the Turk? Can you ever trust the Turks? Give them a finger and soon 
your arm is in danger
10
. Every time they are called to discuss easing tension 
in the Aegean they prefer to bring up the issue of the de-militarisation of 
our islands. They never came to terms with Greece becoming an 
independent state. They still think we ought to be part of the Ottoman 
Empire. 
For the most part, 2002 was a year of suspicion in respect to Greek-Turkish 
relations. Most of the officers were consistently reverting to discursive themes and 
examples that revolved around the idea of mistrust, although both countries were taking 
positive steps towards mutual trust and cooperation at a political level. In February the 
two countries signed an agreement of cooperation in the fields of energy, industry, 
agriculture and transportation. With reference to the Aegean, both Greece and Turkey 
agreed to fewer military exercises, and the respective ministers of external affairs 
together visited the Middle East. None of the aforementioned developments though had 
wide media coverage, which could perhaps explain the discrepancy between actual 
political developments and the people’s views of the two countries’ relations. 
 The events that took place in December 2002 however, signalled a new era in 
Greek perceptions of Turks and Turkey. The European Union was scheduled to meet in 
Copenhagen on the 12
th
 and 13
th
 of that month to discuss, among other issues, the 
application of Cyprus to the EU as well as the prospect of Turkey’s incorporation at a 
later stage. In the context of this meeting, the Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Anaan, 
prepared a protocol for the resolution of the Cyprus problem which the Turkish Cypriot 
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government would not accept, much to the dismay of perhaps the majority of Turkish 
Cypriots who declared their desire to become part of the European Union. The Greek 
government and that of the Republic of Cyprus on the other hand, were satisfied with the 
final decision in Copenhagen according to which the Republic was to become affiliated 
to the EU independently of whether a resolution was realized or not
11
. 
 In relation to Turkey, and despite considerable pressure applied by the US on 
European leaders, the European Union decided that the country did not meet the criteria 
that could guarantee her a date of membership and the issue was postponed indefinitely. 
Greece was – perhaps counter-intuitively – one of the EU countries that supported 
Turkey’s incorporation, a stance that further strengthened the friendship policy of the 
two countries. It was probably the first time that ‘the supposedly unbeatable Turkey 
appealed to Greece for support in order to obtain the dear ‘date of membership’.12  
 The results of the Copenhagen meeting descended on Greece as a revelatory 
moment that nevertheless presented the Greeks with new paradoxes and inconsistencies 
that needed to be incorporated into the local systems of political causality. Greece 
appeared not only to support Turkey in joining the EU, but also to be almost sponsoring 
her application to the European coalition. The US – predictably according to most 
Greeks – tried to ‘enforce’ Turkey’s membership but proved – surprisingly, and again, 
according to most Greeks, unpredictably – unable to dictate European policy, while the 
results of the meeting were positive for the Republic of Cyprus. Suddenly, Greece 
ceased to appear in the eyes of her citizens as a weak and always wronged nation, the US 
lost some of its appeal as the all-powerful, and Turkey emerged as a country seeking her 
neighbour’s support. The exhilaration of the Greek public notwithstanding, some of the 
comments of my informants are, I believe, indicative of the confusion that these 
developments created to their political, cosmological order. 
Don’t think that because the Europeans appeared to say ‘no’ to the US that 
something really changed. Greece and Turkey are like toys in their hands. It 
is in their interest now that we cooperate and for this reason they probably 
created an artificial tension, to bring the two countries together. Or it might 
be that the US really played the wrong card this time and the Europeans got 
pissed off. Who knows? And what they say about criteria [meaning the 
criteria that Turkey has to fulfil in order to join the EU] is all bullshit. The 
Germans don’t want it because they have a lot of Turkish migrants and 
should Turkey join the EU all these people will have citizen rights. It’s all a 
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big game. Both Greece and Turkey think they are something, but we are 
nothing. Just toys in their hands. 
Most of my informants believed that the persistence of the US irritated European leaders 
who might have not decided against Turkey if less overt pressure had been applied. ‘You 
see’, Yannis told me, ‘the Turks are like us, factionalists. They don’t understand the 
Europeans. They thought that if the US put in a good word for them it would be OK. But 
it was not. Just as a matter of principle a German or a French would do the opposite’.  
 As Theodossopoulos (this volume) argues, probably the central point of cultural 
intimacy between Greeks and Turks relates to the ‘unofficial’ side of their respective 
profiles: powerlessness, factionalism, but mainly their perceived inability to be 
understood by Europeans. It is true that in Greece there is a widely held perception that 
Turkey is less modernized and in certain areas – such as human rights, for instance – less 
‘civilized’. It is also true that most Greeks, including my informants, perceive 
themselves as ‘rightfully’ belonging to Europe, ‘undoubtedly’ more so than Turkey. ‘It 
has become clear’, one of my informants argued, ‘we have managed to find ourselves on 
the other side of the hill. We are part of Europe. Turkey will follow but they will have to 
undergo the same painstaking process as we did. They will one day manage to become 
Europeans.’  
At other times, however, the officers perceive their own imagined community as 
following a parallel course with the imagined community of the Other. Both countries 
are regarded as having a common goal, that is their official incorporation into the ‘West’ 
and both countries’ failures are seen as perhaps not so much related to ‘real’ problems, 
but stemming from their incapacity to communicate to more sophisticated Others the 
right message in the right language. As Thanassis commented: ‘I was happy with the 
decisions taken in Copenhagen and I believe that perhaps for the first time we managed 
to speak in their [ie. ‘the Europeans’] language, and we were finally understood’.  
It is in the aforementioned context that most of my informants criticized France’s 
and Italy’s refusal to support Turkey’s defences against Iraq, should Turkey offer 
military assistance to the US. ‘I’ve told you before’, Argyris commented, ‘the Turks 
have still a lot to learn about European sly tricks. Those guys [‘the Europeans’] have no 
honour my friend. They are neither your friends, nor you enemies. You never actually 
know what on earth they are to you!’ 
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CONCLUSION 
I have argued earlier in the chapter that national identity – as in all categories of identity 
– can be viewed as relational and performative if its fluidity, positionality and unfinished 
character are to be theoretically and politically appreciated. The sense of national Self is 
constructed not only on the basis of the belief that one is part of an imagined community 
but also, and perhaps most importantly, on to the conviction that the national Other 
belongs to a community which is preferably homogenous, hitherto essentialised and 
engaged in activity as ‘steady, anonymous and simultaneous’ as that of the Self 
(Anderson 1983: 31). In many ways, as Loizos (1988), Hirschon (2000), Just (1989) and 
others have maintained, the ability to imagine the Self – and I would argue the Other as 
well – as part of a national community rests on a vision of the nation as a metaphor of 
the ‘family’ constituting kinship as an idiom that mediates nationality, ethnicity and 
notions of collectivity. 
 When the army officers talk of Turkey and the Turks they do so by performing 
Greekness, and thus their commentary is composed of culturally informed ways of 
viewing the world. Turkey can be anything from a friend to a foe, from a threatening to a 
culturally intimate Other, but, above all, Turkey – like Greece – will be what some 
powerful Others want her to be. Sutton claims that viewing the ‘foreign finger’ (the 
western ‘Great Powers’, that is) as the decisive factor in political and diplomatic reality 
is not ‘an exception but the consistent pattern in Greece’s relationship with the West’ 
(2003: 197). I do not intend to discuss here whether these perceptions are warranted, as 
Sutton believes, or not as others would argue (cf. Pipes 1996, 1997; Mouzelis 1993). 
What interests me more is that the army officers – and many other Greeks – 
conceptualise Turkey and Greece as being essentially the same, in that they both strive 
to become Europeans through a painstaking process of effacing their ‘Oriental’ features 
and that they both have their policies and diplomacy dictated by the ‘Great Powers’ who 
‘play games at their expense’ (cf. Sutton 2003: 204; Brown & Theodossopoulos 2000; 
2003). In this respect, I would agree with Bastea’s comment that ‘we resemble our 
neighbours more than we resemble our ancestors’ (2003: 167).  
Experiences of betrayal by the West, feelings of marginality and the problems of 
transition are perhaps the very features that disprove nationalist myths of ‘essential 
“otherness” and the “difference” of the Other’ (Danforth 2003: 215). As is true of 
cultural intimacy between Greeks (Herzfeld 1995, 1997), notions of affinity between 
Greeks and Turks rely on perceptions of a shared unofficial orientalism and the 
 194 
conviction that should both countries wish to ‘make any progress’ they must ‘learn to be 
good Europeans’ (ibid: 134). The performative and experiential aspect of Greek identity 
thus becomes an important aspect of perceiving, envisaging and explaining the imagined 
community of the Other, and the orientation and purpose of its ‘steady, anonymous and 
simultaneous activity’ (Anderson 1983: 31). 
 Documenting the officers’ discourses over a period of time meant that I could see 
the changes and inconsistencies that stem from the positional and contextual character of 
the national Self. As Brown and Hamilakis argue the ‘components of the myth of the 
nation present an internally contradictory picture’ (2003: 8) and this, I believe, refers to 
the relational aspect of identity. Acknowledging one’s identity always in relation to 
Others implies that the Self is never in stasis and that her perceptions of the Other – be it 
friend or foe or anything in between – are constantly changing. To be a Greek – as to be 
anything – is no simple and straightforward matter if the subject is viewed as a multiply 
constituted entity with many and, at times, conflicting identifications (cf. Moore 1994). 
The unfinished, imagined, relational and perfomative character of national identity is 
what renders it a ‘hollow category’ in the sense that Theodossopoulos (this volume) 
understands it; not empty of meaning, but ample, flexible and ever capable of 
incorporating new historical and political changes. 
Daily commentary – even in the form of conspiracy theories – and spontaneous 
attempts at political aetiology are precisely the ways in which the actor participates in 
the making of history: by endorsing, refusing, distorting, challenging, denying, by 
striving to make sense of grand narratives and large-scale political action through 
establishing some connections between them and her own lived cultural experience (cf. 
Papadakis 1994; Sutton 2003; Brown & Theodossopoulos 2000, 2003). Agency is then 
to be found not only in political decisions, but also at the point of intersection of the 
personal and the intimate with the imagined collectivity of the Self and the Other(s), 
which can be both discursive and practical in the sense that it can inspire action. It is 
then a matter of whether imagining and explaining the world as a sum of homogenous 
‘synchronised’ collectivities leaves any room for the ‘idea of individual responsibility  
…causal and contextual specificity’ (Loizos, 1988: 649, original emphasis), or results in 
a ‘totalizing doctrine of collective passive solidarity’ (ibid: 650). For, if the latter is the 
case, the Greeks – like other national subjects – will continue seeing the Turks, and all 
national others, as friends, foes, friends and foes, sometimes friends and sometimes foes, 
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but sadly, always as nothing more than a faceless collectivity that happens to inhabit the 
other end of the Aegean. 
 
NOTES
                                                          
1
 Throughout my introduction I have been discussing national and ethnic identity 
without exploring the differences between the two. This use of the concepts is not 
intending to conflate their differences, but is rather a product of a general theoretical 
view of identity in its social and personal expressions.     
2
 Bentley (1987) in particular proposed the application of Bourdieu’s notions of practice 
and habitus to the study of ethnicity, receiving pointed criticism by Yelvington on the 
fact that his proposition inherits all the problems that accompany Bourdieu’s theory 
(1991: 160). 
3
 Hamilakis suggestively refers to national school celebrations, marches, school visits to 
museums and church ceremonies as well as the school textbooks ‘which are meant to be 
publicly performed in the classroom rather than studied privately’ (2003: 60-61).   
4
  Instabul and Constantinople is a case of ‘conflictual resemblance’, a competition of 
Turks and mostly Greeks over the symbolic ownership of a city through the strategy of 
naming (Harrison 2002; Theodossopoulos this volume). For the importance of 
Constantinople as the spiritual, and dare I say emotional, centre of the Greek world, see 
Just (1989) and (Macridge 1981) suggestively.    
5
 Thanasis is referring here to the reactions of the Greek public upon the arrest of the 
leader of the Kurdish autonomist movement in 1999. Regarded by the Turkish state as a 
terrorist, Abdullah Ocalan sought asylum in Greece. The Greek government tried to 
avoid an escalation in the Greek-Turkish relations by sending Ocalan to the Greek 
embassy in Kenya where he was finally captured by Turkish special forces. The Greek 
public saw this as a dishonest move on behalf of the government that was widely 
accused of ‘handing Ocalan over to the Turks’.  
6
 FIR stands for ‘Flight Information Region’, the limits of which has been a matter of 
dispute between Greece and Turkey. FIR limits of European countries were established 
in Paris in 1952 and in Geneva in 1958. Issuing NOTAM 714 Turkey attempted in 1974 
to expand Istanbul’s FIR jurisdiction over the Aegean westwards. In an effort to resolve 
the situation that was disrupting the air traffic in the area, the ICAO (International Civil 
Aviation Organisation) mediated by appealing to both countries. Turkey finally 
withdrew NOTAM 714 in February 1980.  
7
 Otherwise known as ‘scrambles’ or interceptions.  
8
 It has to be mentioned at this point that Greeks collectively perceive themselves as 
being either ‘ahead’ of Turkey in the course of this ‘transformation’ or ‘behind’ 
according to the circumstances, but almost never at the same point.  
9
 For a fuller picture of the Greek views on the Euroarmy and reactions to the final 
decisions, see a suggestive series of articles by G. Kartalis in the newspaper To Vima 
from December 2001 until March  2002.  
10
 The rhetoric of suspicion in Greece is actually a very well documented one and relates 
closely to the idea that one compromise will most certainly lead to another. In April 
2005 there was again a minor incident in the Imia/Kardak area that fortunately did not 
develop into a major crisis. A Greek fisherman who happened to be in the area at the 
time reported that he was ordered by the Turkish authorities to ‘leave because these were 
Turkish waters’. ‘I refused and responded to them in the broken English that we both 
spoke that I was going nowhere and these were definitely Greek waters’, the fisherman 
added and commented: ‘I could go of course, but had I left this time, next time they 
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would order me to go even further away. Give them an inch, and soon they’ll claim that 
Leros [a Greek island well within the borders] is Turkish too’.   
11
 The Anaan plan was finally accepted by the Turkish Cypriot side, but rejected by the 
Greek Cypriots, in April 2004, while the Republic of Cyprus (the Greek Cypriot side 
that is) became indeed affiliated to the EU as planned, despite the absence of political 
solution to the problem.  
12
 This is what Mihalis Neonakis, a MP of PASOK – the ruling party in Greece at the 
time– wrote in the newspaper To Vima on Sunday, 1st of December 2002, that is ten days 
before the actual Copenhagen meeting. 
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